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REPORT ON THE DENVER DISTRICT COURTS*
By HON. ROBERT W. STEELE, Presiding Judge
of Second Judicial District, State of Colorado

A lot of things have happened to me since becoming a judge.
I have been praised and cursed, affirmed and reversed. I have
seen my picture in the Hall of Fame on the back page one week
and have been roasted on the editorial page the next. I have been
sued for damages in the Federal Court by a disgruntled litigant.
I have been threatened with bodily injury verbally and with a
double-barreled shotgun. I have been alluded to in the first part
of an opinion of the Supreme Court as "the learned trial judge,"
only to see it demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt in the rest
of the opinion that, so far as the law involved in that particular
case was concerned, I had never learned a thing.
Now I am undergoing a transformation. I used to be a trial
judge. Now I am rapidly becoming a statistician. All my life I
have been conscious of a marked ineptitude for fooling with figures, and now I eat 'em up. At the close of each day I eagerly
ask my clerks: How many trials today, how many dismissals,
how many default judgments, how many quiet-title decrees, how
many final decrees in divorce, how many determinations of heirship; and then, of course, with my fingers crossed, how many new
cases were filed this day?
Do not misunderstand me. I approved of this new deal before it was put into effect, and I approve of it now. I accepted
the assignment of presiding judge and had something to do with
working out the mechanical details of the plan, and I am hell-bent
on making it work.
This report deals primarily with civil cases. The presiding
judge must keep the criminal divisions supplied with jurors as
needed and must secure the services of extra judges occasionally
for criminal cases; but the assignment of cases for trial, the
determination of all preliminary matters and the trials themselves
in criminal cases are handled by the two judges assigned to the
criminal divisions.
As you know, all cases involving domestic relations are automatically assigned for all purposes to Judge Cook, and he is taking
excellent care of his docket with efficiency and dispatch. I am
interested, of course, in the number of domestic relations cases
disposed of and send him jurors and provide him with outside
judges when requested.
The duties of the presiding judge under the present plan are
divided into three main categories. First, he is in charge of the
entire jury panel for all divisions, civil and criminal. A new panel
is drawn from the wheel every two weeks throughout the year.
* This report was made at the Denver Bar Association luncheon on April 5,
1954, at the Chamber of Commerce Building.
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The presiding judge must be present along with the other officials
designated by statute when the names are drawn from the wheel.
All jurors are notified to report to the presiding judge and consequently all excuses must be presented to him. On an average,
two names must be drawn for every one needed for actual service,
and the usual number of jurors needed for a two-week period is
about 150. To relieve the judge of having to hear over a hundred
excuses every two weeks, and from other details regarding jury
service, two special bailiffs, a man and woman, are assigned to
the presiding judge. These are in addition to the regular bailiff.
They listen to most of the excuses, keep the pay-roll records of all
jurors, assign them by lot to the various courts requesting them,
issue the certificates upon completion of their services, stay with
them when they are locked up for the night, and generally take
care of their needs.
Frequently something happens to a case, civil or criminal,
on the eve of trial, so that a jury is not required, and in such
cases the special bailiffs, using their own phones, communicate
with the jurors at their homes and tell them not to report for duty
the following day. Hardly a week goes by that such is not done,
and for each call made, the city is saved one dollar and a half. The
average saving per week amounts to about $100.00.
The second of the three major duties of the presiding judge
concerns the hearing of motions and matters preliminary to trial
and the disposition of non-controversial actions. The presiding
judge tries no cases. He hears motions in all cases not criminal
or involving domestic relations, hears and enters decrees in quieftitle suits, determination of heirships, change of name, and enters
judgments by default. He also sits on all citations where judgment debtors are summoned to answer concerning their property,
hears and determines applications for temporary restraining orders (other than in divorce cases), and citations in contempt and
anything else that may arise before trial.
Motions must be set for hearing upon notice, as formerly.
Those which can be heard in a short time are set for nine o'clock.
Those requiring more time are set for ten o'clock and eleven
o'clock, and in the very long ones at two o'clock. So far, this
schedule has been carried out almost on the dot, and motions and
other preliminary and non-contested matters, long or short, can
be heard within a week or ten days from the time a setting is
requested. The average of dispositions of this type is running
seventy a week.
Default judgments, which under the rules can be entered by
the clerk without calling on the judge, are farmed out to the five
trial divisions. This is done to save the clerk of the presiding
judge the time required in checking each case where defaults are
asked for and in writing a minute order for each judgment entered.
The minutes of a division clerk when only a trial is in progress
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are comparatively short and few and this expedient makes it possible for the clerk in my division to keep his work up to date.
The third main job of the presiding judge is to assign the
cases for trial to the five judges and to keep each trial judge busy
five days a week. No division has been made between trials to court
and trials to jury. The cases are assigned for trial to the available judges regardless of whether they are to be determined by
court or jury.
On January 12, 1954, the effective date of the new plan, all
civil cases except those involving domestic relations were transferred by court order to the division of the presiding judge. Each
of the seven civil divisions had its own trial docket and it was
necessary to compile some sort of list or docket embracing all
cases ready for trial from all divisions and to honor as nearly as
possible the dates which had been assigned for trial or the order
in which they appeared on the various dockets of the seven divisions. The first list contained 420 cases and was published in the
Daily Journal. The cases were grouped in brackets, each bracket
covering a two-week period, and containing about 25 cases, except
for the five periods during the summer when only ten cases appear.
This plan seemed to have advantages over the system used previously where the cases on the list were numbered consecutively
with no breakdown as to probable date of trial.
Soon after the first list was published, a second list was prepared and printed, containing 150 cases, showing the last 27 cases
tentatively for trial in the last of December, 1954. Since that time,
about 250 additional cases have been put on the trial docket. This
makes a grand total to date of 820 cases on the trial calendar, and
the last will appear on the next published list for trial probably
about April or May, 1955.
To assist the presiding judge, a docket clerk has been appointed. His name is Oral K. Wilson. He has a desk and a telephone in a room adjoining the Judge's Chambers, and his duties
relate only to the setting of cases for trial and the assignment
on the day of trial. He keeps a card index of all cases on the docket
showing dates set for trial and dispositions by judgment, settlement or otherwise. Every two weeks the docket clerk mails notices
to attorneys in 30 or 40 cases advising them to appear in open
court before the judge and arrange for the setting for trial of
their cases. The notices advise counsel that their cases will be
set for trial during a certain two-week period, which is always
five or six weeks in advance of the appearance in court. Definite
days within the period are assigned each case but the judges who
will try them are not designated until the day of the trial. Including the call for tomorrow morning, there have been seven sets' of
notices sent out by the clerk involving 273 cases and sent to 568
lawyers.
Due to continuances, settlements and other hazards, some
cases are stricken from the assigned trial dates, leaving open days
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for trial, and at the time of the appearance in court in response
to notices these dates are offered the attorneys for trial. If there
are still open dates after all cases have been called, any case can
be tried on those dates whether it has been placed on the docket
or not, or, if on the docket, regardless of its position.
This system has been in use exactly twelve weeks. There have
been a few days when some of the trial judges have not been busy.
Litigants will go to the hospital for operations the night before
the trial and lawyers will continue to wait until the gavel sounds
before agreeing on a settlement, thus making it impossible to
start another case the same day. Three of the twelve weeks were
one court day short and five trial judges have not been available
all of the time. One hundred and twenty cases have been tried, an
average of ten per week, and 204 cases have been dismissed, or
an average of 27 cases per week for trials and dismissals.
Since the first of the year about 30 cases have been placed
on the trial docket each week. This looks like a falling behind of
at least three cases a week, but the figures quoted do not in my
judgment reflect a true appraisal of the plan. The number of cases
included in the call for trial settings has been increased, which
should result in an increase in the number of actual trials. For
instance, during the two-week period just past, 28 cases were tried,
an average of 14 per week.
I would like to comment briefly on pre-trials. All of the cases
appearing on the first two lists had either been set for trial or
were ready for trial in the separate divisions and presumably
pre-trials had been held in all of these cases. The rule in effect
before January 12th required a pre-trial before a trial date could
be procured. Consequently, the first 570 cases on the lists have
already been pre-tried, and it will be some time before these cases
can be disposed of. Cases now becoming at issue but without pretrial are placed on the trial docket when request is made; and I
have in mind discussing with Judge Holland a plan whereby pretrials can be had in these cases; not mandatory as formerly, but
only if requested by counsel. Who will preside at the pre-trials
remains to be seen. Obviously, there can be no assurance that the
pre-trial judge will try the case, in instances this could be arranged.
Here are my predictions for 1954, based on what has happened the first three months: There will be 6,896 new cases filed.
Of these, 2,758 will involve domestic relations. In October, 1,065
cases will be dismissed under Rule 18. Judge Cook will enter 1,564
interlocutory decrees in divorce, 1,316 final decrees in divorce,
and many decrees of annulment, and separate maintenance. 575
cases will be tried, and 950 cases will be dismissed. I will enter
judgments and sign decrees in quiet-title suits and similar actions
to the number of 1,740, and will hear and rile on about 2,500
motions. 1,568 cases will be placed on the trial docket; and this
does not include the 500 already there when the plan went into
effect. This is our song; it is entitled, "There've Been Some
Changes Made." You be the judge. Will it be a hit or a miss?
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ENFORCEABILITY OF INTEREST ON INTEREST
IN COLORADO
LESLIE R. KEHL*

This article is intended to be an examination of all the law
in Colorado relevant to the question, "Is a prior agreement to
compound interest, if such interest is not paid on accrual, enforceable in Colorado?"
The validity of such an agreement under usury laws is not
considered except to distinguish the problem here involved from
the problem in the usury cases. Neither does this article deal with
the validity of increasing the rate of interest on default of either
interest or principal.
Promissory notes which include a provision for compounding
interest are in common usage in the state of Colorado. Examples
of such provisions are the following:
If principal and interest are not paid when due, to
bear interest at the rate of ----per cent per annum payable
annually.
Upon failure to pay any installment of principal or
interest when due, the entire balance owing hereon .
shall draw interest . . .
Makers and endorses agree that if this note is not
paid promptly at maturity, that unpaid principal and defaulting interest shall bear interest . . .I
Apparently from the common usage these provisions enjoy, the
public is of the opinion that such provisions are binding. The law,
however, is not as certain as this opinion would indicate.
STARE DECIsIS

The first indication that the Colorado court would not allow
contracting in advance to pay interest on interest appeared in
an 1881 case involving the plaintiff's right to interest on rents
wrongfully withheld. The court analogized between rents and
interest in this language:
The earlier authorities were emphatic in their refusal of interest in such (rent) cases. The doctrine was
'interest is a compensation for the use of moneys; rents
a compensation for the use of lands; compound interest
(though agreed to by the parties) will never be allowed;
so neither will interest be allowed on rent in arrears.' 2
The reference to compound interest was actually dictum and no
Colorado authority was cited. The dictum was cited a year later
* Student at the University of Denver, College of Law.

'Taken from form notes currently in use in Denver, Colo.
- Filmore v. Reithman, 6 Colo. 120 (1881).
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when the court reversed a decree of the lower court on grounds
that the amount of interest was reached by compounding interest
under the legal interest statute. The court held such action was
not warranted under the statute. The words "moneys after they
in the statute, were interpreted to not income due," appearing
3
clude interest due.
Shortly thereafter came the leading case of Hochmark v.
Richler 4 which left no doubt concerning the state of the law. In
this case a loan of $150 was obtained and the note was given a
face value of $177 which included $27 interest. The note was to
draw interest at 3% per annum on the face value if not paid at
maturity. The court refused to enforce the 3% interest on the
$27 stating this was compound interest and not enforceable in
this state.5
The law set out in the Hochmark case has never been expressly
overruled and has been recognized in a number of subsequent
cases. 6 The effect on the validity of the contract, as a whole, is
made clear by the Hochmark case and is to be differentiated from
the effect of usury. The rule of the case is based on a public policy
against interest on interest and not on interest which aggregates
more than the legal rate. The ruling is not as drastic as in usury
cases and results only in non-enforcement of the amount of interterest which is attributable to interest on interest. The court
states:
The fact that compound interest was thus provided
for did not, however, as counsel contends, render the entire contract usurious and void. Courts upon grounds of
public policy, simply decline to enforce payment of the
interest upon interest.It should also be noted that the case goes further than holding
compound interest, strictly speaking, is not recoverable, and concludes that any interest on interest is not recoverable. The distinction betwen compound interest and interest on interest is made
clear in the following language:
There are two distinct methods of computing what
is loosely termed compound interest. By the first method
periodical rests are made and at each rest the principal
and the accrued interest thereon are combined into a
new principal which bears interest until the next rest
and so on; this method results in giving interest not only
on the principal and on the interest on the principal, but
Denver Brick and Mfg. Co.

%.

416 Colo. 263, 26 P. 818 (1891).

McAllister, 6 Colo. 261 (1882).

See also Beckwith v. Beckwith, 11 Colo. 568, 19 P. 510 (1888), to the same
effect as the principal case.
6Lake County v. Linn, 29 Colo. 446, 88 P.

Colo. 115, 111 P. 713 (1910).
7
Note 4, sipri.

839 (1902);

Wigton v. Elliott, 49'
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also in giving interest on the interest on the interest and
so on ad infinitum until payment, and this is what is
meant by compound interest when the term is used in
its strict sense. By the other method the accrued interest
is not combined with the principal but each installment
of interest on the principal becomes itself a new principal which bears simple interest, but no interest is allowed
on the interest on interest, and, although this method is
also sometimes called compound interest it has been more
correctly described as a middle course between simple
and compound interest, and has been distinguished from
compound interest. 8
Although the term "compound interest" is used in the Hochmark
case, it is clear from the facts that the court was dealing only
with interest on interest, or as it is sometimes called "annual
interest." 9 Thus, if no annual interest is allowed, a fortiori, no
compound interest is allowed.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HOCHMARK RULE
The Hochmark case indirectly mentions this exception to the
general rule, "There was in the present case no such gross delinquency or intentional misconduct on the part of appellant as justified an exception to the foregoing rule." 14)
In addition to this exception, the Colorado court has added
these exceptions in following decisions:
1. Coupons representing interest on a municipal bond are subject
to interest on the coupons themselves. 1
2. Coupons representing interest on a promissory note are subject to interest on the coupons themselves. (Distinguished
from
12
exception number 1 in that this is a private obligation.)_
3. An agreement executed after interest accrues to subject 13such
accrued interest to a charge of interest on itself, is valid.
4. An agreement made and payable in another state where interest on interest is allowed will be enforced in Colorado even
though such agreement would have been invalid if made in
14
Colorado.
THEORY BEHIND THE LAW
The reason for the Hochmark decision was clearly public
policy, but the basis behind the public policy is not so easily ascertained. Reliance is placed on Parsons on Contracts.': Parsons
states:
'C.J.S. (Interest) Sec. 1, 1). 10.
A.L.R. 332.

"37

"See

also Filmore v. Reithman, .'tpr~t. note 2.

Lake County v. Linn, sitpr, note 5.
Parker v. McGinty, 77 Colo. 458, 239 P. 10 (1925).
'"Wigton v. Elliott, vifpra. note 5.
"Baxter v. Beckwith, 25 Colo. App. 322, 137 P. 901 (1914).
" Although the court cites volume two of this work it is believed the proper
citation is Vol. 3, 6th edition (1873), Sec. 150 rt sCq.
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Upon the whole, although it seems to be well settled
that compound interest cannot be recovered, as such,
even if it be expressly promised, we are inclined to think,
that the only rule of law against the allowance of compound interest is this: that the courts will not lend their
aid to enforce its payment, unless upon a promise of the
debtor made after the interest, upon which interest is
demanded, has accrued; and this rule is adopted, not because such contracts are usurious, or savor of usury, unless very remotely; but upon grounds of public policy, in
order to avoid harsh and oppressive accumulations of interest. And for the reason that this aversion of our law
to allow money to beget money has of late years very
much diminished, we do not think it absolutely certain,
that a bargain in advance for the payment of compound
interest, in all its facts reasonable and free from suspicion of oppression, would not be enforced at this day
in some of our courts. It has, indeed, been held that an
agreement to pay interest on accrued interest, is not invalid.
Thus we perceive the basic theory to be, "Prior agreements to
compound interest on default are harsh and oppressive." It appears that agreements made after the accrual of interest are
equally harsh and oppressive since the result achieved is the same.
One difference is, however, readily ascertainable. The debtor has
a choice at the end of each period when there is no prior agreement. Of course, it is not a choice without some amount of coercion in the form of a debt due and owing with possible judgment
and execution on failure to agree to compounding the interest. It
is also ironic to note that if a judgment were obtained, the judgment would undoubtedly include the amount of the interest, and
the court would allow the legal rate of interest on the full amount
of the judgment, until satisfied. Thus the debtor finds himself
paying interest on interest regardless of the alternative he chooses.
The theory in favor of allowance of interest on interest is
well expressed in Hale v. Hale :16
If it be assumed that it was stipulated in the original contract that the interest should be paid, we hold
that there is nothing illegal or immoral or contrary to
policy in such an agreement. The interest is both legally
and equitably due at the expiration of the period limited
for its payment; and if, instead of paying the interest,
it be converted into principal by the previous agreement
of the parties, we think there can be no objection to enforcing such an agreement.
"Hale v. Hale, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 233, 78 Am. Dec. 490 (1860).
this case is found in 37 A.L.R. 328.

A note on
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Thus we have the opposing theories. One on the premise,
"Do not kick a man when he is down," and the other on the premise, "The creditor is being deprived of money he is legally entitled
to have and therefore the creditor should receive the value of the
use of this money."
THE LAW TODAY
As we have seen the Colorado court has come to the aid of the
debtor in past years on grounds of public policy. (This is a rather
unexpected result when you consider that the same public policy
is not offended by a cognovit provision in a note.) Yet public
policy is a changing standard and perhaps the modern trend in
favor of interest on interest mentioned, but not followed, in Parsons on Contracts (1873) supra, and reiterated in Hochmark v.
Richler (1891) supra, has been adopted in Colorado.
A statement made by Mr. Justice Burke in a 1942 case might
be interpreted as adopting the trend. The statement was, "Compound interest is allowable only when definitely agreed upon." 17
Mr. Justice Burke cites Denver Brick & Mfg. Co. v. McAllister,
supra, as authority for his position. As mentioned earlier in this
article, it is authority only for the proposition that the legal interest statute does not provide for compounding the interest provided in that statute. In fact, Denver Brick & Mfg. Co. expressly
follows Filmore v. Reithman, supra, which was the first case stating the general rule against interest on interest.
The statement made by Mr. Justice Burke was not necessary
to the decision and therefore must be weighed as dictum in considering its effect on prior decisions. Also it must be held that the
words "compound interest" as used by Justice Burke must mean
the compounding of interest by agreement entered prior to the
accrual. The Colorado court has, in effect, held that the words
"compound interest" indicate a prior agreement. The Court expressly stated that an agreement after accrual of interest to add
such accrued interest to the principal and charge interest on the
whole is not compounding interest. Thus by inference there must
be a prior agreement in order to constitute compound interest.
Note this language:
In brief, as applied to the facts of this case, the law
is that after interest becomes due, it may, by agreement,
be turned into principal and bear interest.
Such an ar8
rangement is not compounding interest.'
Apparently then, considering this language, Justice Burke's statement amounts to an assertion that an express agreement to compound interest on accrual is enforceable.
There has been no judicial interpretation of this language
in Colorado and no express interpretation by any court. The Fed' Tarabino Real Estate Co. Inc. v. Tarabino, 109 Colo. 425, 126 P.

"Wigton v. Elliott, 49 Colo. 115, 111 P. 713 (1910).

859 (1942).
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eral District Court for the District of Missouri did have occasion
to construe Colorado law with respect to compound interest in
1944, two years after Justice Burke's dictum. That court followed
the Hochmark case and refused to allow interest on interest.":
The dictum was not mentioned and probably not considered.
Although the Missouri Federal Court's decision is in no way
binding on the Colorado court it indicates that a Supreme Court
decision will be necessary to detrmine the present state of the law
in Colorado concerning compound interest. In the opinion of the
writer, the time is ripe for an attack upon the doctrine establishing the non-enforceability of interest on interest. The court may
well seize upon Justice Burke's dictum to establish a current public
policy in favor of interest on interest.

AMENDMENT OF SUPREME COURT RULE
Effective April 15, 1954, the rule relating to the Supreme
Court Library was amended to read as follows:
Rule 262. Supreme Court Library. No books
may be removed or withdrawn from the library by
any person, except members of the court for use in
their chambers.
Members of the Bar are asked to search their office as
well as their conscience, for the following volumes, missing
from the library:
Vol. 4, Nebraska Revised Statutes, 1943.
Vols. 508, 598, 1282, 1448, 1531 and 1611 of the bound
volumes of Abstracts and Briefs. These volumes cannot be
replaced and the co-operation of the Bar is solicited in effecting their return to the library.
FLOYD F. MILES, Librarian.

CONFERENCE DATE SET
The Annual Judicial Conference of the Tenth Circuit
will be held at the Stanley Hotel, in Estes Park, Colorado,
Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, July 12, 13 and 14, 1954.
Reservations can be made by writing Mr. George Stobie, Manager of the Hotel. All i.iembers of the Bar are cordially invited to attend.
"Lee
(1944).

v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., 56 F. Supp. 362
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THE PROBLEMS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE*
DR. ROBERT COHEN, M.D.**

The topic-"The problems of Marriage and Divorce"-is an
interesting one, and I would like to present it to you from a very
practical psychiatric standpoint. I'd like to present it to you in the
manner in which I see it in my office, because frequently I am asked,
by people in your profession, about some of the opinions that we
in our profession have about people who are about to be divorcedwhether or not divorce should actually occur.
Specifically, though, before we talk about divorce, which to
me is certailily an evidence of unsuccessful marriage, we ought to
talk about successful marriage.
Contrary to popular opinion, successful marriage is not "made
in heaven." Rather, the components for success or failure in marriage are developed in the family relationships of the bride and
the groom with their parents long before anyone had any thoughts
of marriage-actually, in the first seven years of their lives, and,
specifically, between the ages of three to seven years.
Astounding, you say? Not at all, I must answer; for it is
during this period in the life of the future bride and groom that
the attributes of future success or failure in marriage are developed. Successful marriage, psychologically, is predicated on
three specific attributes: on the capacity for love, on normal attitudes about sex, and about conformity of the marriage partners
to the demands of society and the culture in which we live. Let
me take those up, one at a time, briefly.
Contrary to what perhaps you might have believed, the capacity for love is not inherent in everyone. Actually, the capacity
for love has to be learned, because the infant at birth, far from
being an individual capable of love, is the most selfish creature in
the world. Love, from a psychiatric standpoint, is the ability to
give of self to another person. It is actually a state of altruism.
The infant who starts as the most selfish creature in the world
has to make a tremendous transition from the period of infancy
and his selfishness to the place where he is sufficiently altruistic to
* This article is an adaptation of an address given by Dr. Cohen on April
22, 1954, at the Sixth Annual Law Institute presented at the University of Denver under the joint sponsorship of the University of Denver College of Law,
the Domestic Relations Committee of the Colorado Bar Association, and the
Junior Bar Sections of the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations upon the
general subject of Family Law.
** Dr. Cohen, a 1932 M.D. graduate of the University of Pittsburgh, is in the
private practice of psychiatry and neurology in Denver. In addition to his practice, he serves as instructor in the University of Colorado Medical School, as
consultant to Fitzsimons Hospital and Fort Warren Air Base, and in industrial
psychiatry to Associated Management Consultants, Denver. Because of the wide
interest in, and the professional relationships of many attorneys to, industrial
affairs, Dr. Cohen will discuss in a forthcoming article, seyeral aspects of industrial psychiatry.
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be able to have the capacity for love, namely, the ability to give
of self to another individual.
Where does this transition begin? How does it begin? It
begins very, very early in life. It begins with the relationship
between the infant and his or her mother. Remember that this
very, very selfish creature, the infant, at the time of birth has
very few needs. It has the needs for food, for rest, and for a clean,
dry skin. Every infant has these needs. The manner in which
the mother figure gives these needs to the infant begins to cause
the infant to develop. He will develop into the individual who is
going to remain a selfish creature or, through normal, successful
transition, the individual who will be able to develop that capacity
for love.
Let's say that this infant is sufficiently lucky to have a mother
who loves him. The infant who has this kind of a mother is given
its needs in a warm, affectionate, and, above all, consistent manner.
The infant begins to develop the feeling, very early in life, that it
can always count on its mother for getting these needs fulfilled
today, tomorrow, next week, next month, and next year. The infant
thus blessed with this kind of a consistent mother is the infant
who is going to develop very early one of the key attitudes; a feeling of being wanted. This key attitude later develops into the
self-confidence which is so necessary in the individual in the development of his capacity for love.
At the very beginning, then, we may easily formulate the
infant's behavior into this statement: the selfish infant wants
what it wants, when it wants it. It is wholely unconcerned with
anything else and is totally unaware of the presence of anything
else but itself.
However, beginning about the age of eighteen months to two
and one-half years, the infant must begin to take cognizance of
the thing that we call reality. The infant, for the first time, during something which perhaps you believe to have been a very insignificant type of thing, toilet training, is asked to begin to conform to the rules of society. This conformance is required by the
demand or request by its mother that it do a certain thing in a
certain specific place. The infant who has had a kind, affectionate,
warm, loving mother is quickly able to learn that it must do what
society asks, and it does so in a completely secure manner. It
doesn't feel that to conform is dangerous; but it does get the feeling that no longer can it do what it wishes to do; it must now do
something in conformity with the rule as put forth by its mother.
As this young individual begins to take cognizance of reality,
the original behavior formula now changes from "I want what I
want because I want it" to "I want what I want, but if it is 'ractical
and.in accordance with the rules of reality." Still later, this kind
of an infant, fortunate enough to have a consistently warm mother,
is encouraged to become independent, and to do things on its own.
Still later, this kind of an individual is taught morality by its
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mother and father. It is taught morality in a very tolerant, easy
manner, and, as soon as it is taught morality, the individual now
once more changes the formula for its behavior, which now becomes, "I want what I want if it is practical and if it is the right
thing to do."
I have taken you very rapidly through the personality development of a normal individual who is thus able to develop the
capacity for love, namely, the ability to give of self to another
individual. That other individual, of course, later on will become
his wife.
The second important feeling, attitude or attribute to a successful marriage is a normal attitude about sex. You who haven't
the experience of a medical student, for instance, perhaps don't
recognize that attitudes about sex are not always normal; not
always the same.
Actually, attitudes about sex begin about the age of eighteen
months when the child, in its seeking for finding out about itself
and the world, in getting some response to its normal curiosity
begins to ask its mother, primarily, and father, secondarily,
"What is this?" and it's told, "This is my nose ;" and, "What is
this?" and it's told, "This is my ear." He comes down here and
finds out that "this is my elbow" and "this is my chest" and "this
is my hip" and then it happens on its genitals.
If this infant has a normal mother who is herself normally
oriented and has normal attitudes about sex, the individual will
get an honest response from her: "That is your penis; that is the
organ with which you urinate." But, unfortunately, there are too
many people in our society today who are themselves neurotic
about sex. These people frequently will respond to the child, "We
don't talk about that, that's dirty-or nasty-or sinful--or bad."
Remember, it's the same kind of mother who will gladly tell
the child over and over again about the functions of its teeth, its
hair, its skin, its locomotion; but when the child asks her a question in its innocent seeking for finding out about itself and gets
to its genitals, the child gets a peculiar answer. This kind of an
answer is the beginning of a peculiar attitude towards sex. From
this start the child inevitably gets the feeling that there is something particularly peculiar about this part of it. That kind of an
attitude frequently carries over-carries over to its adult life.
After the time of very early curiosity seeking, the child gets
to the age of-let's say-eight, nine, or ten. This is a very important
period also, because this is the period when the father should take
his son and tell him about things-tell him about life-tell him
how things occur. Similarly, with the little girl and her mother; the
little girl should begin to know about the menstrual function from
her mother.
The person who has had parents, themselves normal and nonneurotic, will get normal, honest answers from his parents, and,
also, he will be told about the facts of life. The individual, on the
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other hand, having a mother and father who are themselves unable to think normally about sex, becomes further disturbed about
its sexual function because it gets an answer concerned with something bad, simple, nasty, dirty, peculiar. The kind of an individual
who gets that kind of an answer gets to adolescence and begins to
have the normal sexual feeling that Nature endows all of us with
at that point. But this kind of an individual doesn't know what
to do with these new found feelings. He doesn't know how to react
normally toward the opposite sex.
The third important attribute of a successful marriage, psychologically, is the ability to conform with society's demands for
the sex that each person happens to be. By this I mean that our
society expects every male to be an independent, aggressive, competitive individual, able to take and handle responsibility and able
to take care of another person, such as a wife. The female, ideally,
in our culture, is supposed to be the more passive, the more dependent person.
These attitudes and feelings are supplied our children from
their identification with their parents: this kind of identification
specifically occurring about the age of three and one-half to seven.
Normally, at the age of three and one-half the little boy becomes
quite closely attached to his mother. The mother generally remains
his unconscious love object until the age of seven, at which time,
normally, he rejects his mother and should become attached to
the father figure. It is only from his ability to get close to his
father that the little boy is able to take on the normal, masculine
traits concerned with aggressiveness, responsibility-taking, competitiveness, forcefulness, and so on.
Frequently this doesn't occur. Fathers, these days, are too
busy. Some fathers wanted a daughter, perhaps, and got a son.
Some fathers, unfortunately, as in the last war, were away from
home during this very important, critical period. For these little
boys who should have had the opportunity to identify with and
become attached to their fathers, they haa no choice but to remain
attached to the mother figure. Don't get me wrong-I think mothers are fine people. But mothers, unfortunately, are female, and
you can't possibly have a boy get from a female the attributes so
necessary in our society for him to have, and which our society
expects him to have.
Similarly, the little girl at the age of three and one-half, normally, becomes attached to the father figure and stays closely
attached to the father until the age of about seven, at which time,
normally, she rejects the father and becomes closely attached to
her mother. It is due to this normal attachment to and with mother
that she then is able to take on the normal feminine attributes
that our society expects the female to have: the attributes of passivity and dependency, certainly to a fair degree.
These three attributes then, psychologically, are the important ones so far as successful marriage is concerned: the capacity
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for love, normal attitudes about sex, and conformity of the marriage
partners to and with the standards that our society expects of
both males and females. And the real reasons for unsuccessful
marriages-whether or not they may end in divorce-are found
in the failure in or the lack of these three major attributes of successful marriages.
In my experience, most divorces, psychologically, are predicated first on emotional immaturity. Emotional immaturity is
simply the negative aspects of the capacity for love. Quite simply, it
is a state in which the individual doesn't show himself to be sufficiently grown up-compatible, that is, with his chronological age.
He still acts like a little boy, despite the fact that he may be in
his thirties-his twenties-his forties, or what have you. The
individual still shows the selfishness that was normal when he
was an infant, but which now is no longer normal. He shows the
ability to take but not to give. He shows complete irresponsibility:
an inability to take on any responsibility. When he doesn't get
the things he wants his wife to give him; because he is alwavs on
the taking end, he has temper tantrums. He raises hell. He throws
things around. He is still, at the age of twenty or thirty or forty,
the same emotionally immature child that he was at the age of
one or two or five.
This individual, because he has never developed the capacity for love-the ability to give of himself to another personfrequently becomes extremely frustrated. When he becomes extremely frustrated, he will frequently take to alcohol. Then alcohol becomes the presenting problem. But it is important for
you to remember that alcohol frequently is simply a coverup for
an individual's emotional immaturity, which in turn shows that
he has never made the normal transition from the selfishness of
infancy to the altruism of so-called emotional maturity.
The second factor that makes for unsuccessful marriage is
poor sex attitudes. I have already shown you, in talking about
the manner in which the normal sex attitude develops, how some
of these attitudes become abnormal. This occurs, generally, through
the things that the individual is told or the things that he is not
told by the parents. It may derive from the manner in which the
parents, when the youngster was growing up, let the child know
either directly or by innuendo that sex was bad, nasty, dirty,
sinful or a host of other things that certainly do not make for
normal compatibility in marriage.
There are some specific things that we run into that cause
marriages to fall down that are definitely concerned with the
sexual attitude. One of these, most common in females, is frigidity.
Frigidity is a psychological state in which the wife, the female,
is completely unable to derive any satisfaction from the sexual act.
Having told you before about the manner in which the girl
should have become identified with the mother after rejecting
the father, I can now assure you that frigidity is not something
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that happens to people because God is mad at them. Frigidity
is simply the condition that occurs because the little girl didn't
have the opportunity to get close to her mother at the age of seven.
Perhaps the mother didn't like her. Perhaps the mother was interested in boys. The mother may have had too many other children. For one reason or another the mother was too disinterested
and instead of being able to get close to her mother, this little
girl had no choice but to remain attached to the father figure.
There is certainly nothing wrong with fathers-I like them
personally. I'm a father myself. But no matter how good a father
is, he is not a female, and he can't, by the farthest stretch of the
imagination, give his daughter the attributes of femininity that
she needs. The daughter that becomes too closely attached to the
father begins unconsciously to feel that her father is her ideal
male figure. This means, unfortunately, that when she grows up
her husband becomes unconsciously for her the ideal male figure,
namely, her father, and sex for her, then unconsciously becomes
incest-and incest certainly is not a condition which makes for
compatibility in sex or in marriage. For the girl who unconsciously feels that any sexuality is incestuous becomes extremely
guilty and fearful and consequently loses all the normal desire
that should be present in the marital state.
Let's take the other half of the crime-the male. There are
specific sexual attitudes that occur with the male. Impotence or
near impotence as well as premature ejaculation are conditions
which are not theoretical. We frequently see them in our offices,
and we definitely know that these cause a great deal of difficulty
in trying to keep a marriage together.
But I want you to know that impotence or near impotence
or premature ejaculation is something which occurs, generally,
in a boy who has not had the opportunity to become closely enough
identified with his father. He has not been able, therefore, to take
on from his father the normal masculine attitudes of aggressiveness, forcefulness, and independence. He has been too closely attached to his mother figure and has taken on, from the mother
figure, the only things she could offer him: dependency and passivity. While these are very fine for a girl, they obviously are
very bad for a boy in our culture.
The third important reason for unsuccessful marriage or
divorce, as I am sure all psychiatrists see it, is the personality defect
that goes with the wrong kind of identification that the child gets
with its mother and/or its father.
Take a look to see what happens to the passive, dependent
male. Remember that our society expects the male to be aggressive, to be able to take responsibility, to be able to handle competitive situations, and to be forceful. But the individual, who
comes to marriage and instead of being aggressive and forceful
is just the opposite, begins to be threatened by anything adequate
that his wife does. Because he is so passive, anything that his
wife does is more adequate than what he does.
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She, in turn, so far as he is concerned, becomes relatively
more aggressive than he; and he then feels so unconsciously threatened that not only does he neglect to praise her for the good things
that she does, but he begins to belittle her. Ultimately, in too
many cases, he actually will hit her. All of your cases of assault
in marriage are due, at least to a great extent, to this unconscious
threat that the passive male feels toward his wife who appears
relatively much more forceful and aggressive than he.
Let's turn the situation around. Say that the girl is normally
aggressive but appears to be much more aggressive because her
husband is too passive. Or say that the girl, having identified
too strongly with her father, is indeed an aggressive female. What
happens? She finds in a very short time that this man to whom
she was supposed to have been married isn't a man at all. He's
a boy. She finds that he can't carry through a normal, masculine,
male function in which he would take care of her. She finds that
she has to take care of him. She must take the responsibilities
of marriage. She must do the things necessary to protect him.
These three factors, then, which you recognize as the converse
of the successful marriage components, are the factors that, in
my experience, have proved to be the most important attributes
that make for unsuccessful marriage or divorce. In review, these
are emotional immaturity-the inability to develop the capacity
for love; poor attitudes concerned with sex problems and sex feeling-and these, remember, come from the kind of attitudes the
child develops in growing up; and finally, personality defects in
which the individual identifies with the wrong parent. Remember,
this is not in any case the child's fault, but, too frequently, it is due
to the fact that the father is too busy, the father is away, the father
is dominated by a mother figure or to some other type of thing
occurring in a home situation.
What's the moral of this story? So far as the girl is concerned-and all of us who have a daughter, I believe, must think
about this: it's not enough just to teach her that in seeking a husband she must make sure she gets some man with whom she has
common interests, or to make sure she gets a man who has nice
looks and the social graces. For heaven's sake, let's teach her
also that she should have a long enough courtship so that she is
able to observe this future husband of hers in enough situations
to be able to determine if this fellow is sufficiently aggressive
or to find if she is marrying a passive individual who is going to
give her great trouble!
So far as you-lawyers and prospective lawyers-are concerned, please try to be aware of these psychological factors. They
are terribly important, because upon these factors depends the
success or failure of doing something about patching up these
marriages which otherwise definitely will break apart.
The preceding article was transcribed from a recording made by the Lawyers' Service Bureau, 120 West 13th Avenue, Denver, Colorado.
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ESTATE PLANNING CONFERENCE
University of Colorado to offer in August two-week conference
on Estate Planning conducted by A. James Casner of Harvard
A two-week Estate Planning Conference will begin on August
30 at the University of Colorado.
The conference will be conducted by Professor A. James Casner of Harvard Law School, who will lecture for two hours in the
morning and two hours in the afternoon, Monday through Friday,
during each week of the conference.
The course will include a critical analysis of a completed estate plan, prepared on the basis of a hypothetical factual situation.
This plan will present for consideration: income, estate and gift
tax problems; the use of revocable and irrevocable inter vivos
trusts; the settlement of life insurance proceeds; the importance
of concurrently owned property; significant future interests problems; powers of appointment; the marital deduction; the disposal
of business interest; administrative provisions used in wills and
trusts; and conflict of laws problems.
Housing facilities for persons attending the conference, and
their families, will be available in the dormitories on the Boulder
campus.
Registration fee for the conference will be $60. For additional information, write Edward C. King, Dean, School of Law,
University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.

TITLE STANDARDS
Anyone wishing the real estate title standards, as promulgated by the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations, may
obtain them by writing the Record Abstract Co., 725 18th St.,
Denver 2, Colorado.

The moment that law is destroyed, liberty is lost, and men,
left free to enter upon the domains of each other, destroy each
other's rights, and invade the field of each other's liberty.-J. G.
Holland..
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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
RALPH GREENFIELD:

A survey of cases in which appellate courts have reviewed decisions of public assistance agencies suggests that the most important single factor affecting the scope of court review has been the
nature of the claim to public assistance as a legally enforcible right.
Because of the importance of this factor, consideiation will be
given initially to some of the cases in which the courts have authoritatively defined the nature of the right or claim to public assistance.
The latter part of this article is concerned with an analysis
of those cases which deal with the issue of judicial control over
agency decisions. These cases fall into three broad categories. The
first includes cases based on statutes that expressly circumscribe
the review of agency decisions. The second concerns cases that
arose in the absence of statutes authorizing judicial review. The
third group of cases stem from statutes providing for a court
review of agency determinations. Because of space limitations
this article does not include a discussion of the last group of cases.
I.

NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

At common law needy persons in England had no legal right
or claim to public support. Thus Blackstone tells us that until the
reign of Henry VIII, poor and destitute persons were wholly dependent upon the private benevolence of neighbors and the charity
of well-disposed Christians.1 But beginning with the reign of the
Tudors, many statutes were enacted which defined the right of
indigent persons to receive aid from the local poor relief authorities. One of these statutes, known as the Elizabethan Poor Law
(43 Eliz. c. 2 (1601), remained the underlying basis of England's
public assistance laws until 1927.2
The history of the English poor law is significant, in this context, because it indicates that since the days of the Tudors relief
of the poor has been a subject of parliamentary concern and that
the legal right to claim public aid has always stemmed from a legislative enactment.2
Additional interest attaches to the English poor law because
the main features of the assistance laws adopted by the American
colonies were based on the Elizabethan Poor Law, and are still to be
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 BI. Comm. 359 (Cooley's Fourth Edition).

2 For a short history of the English poor law see de Schweinitz, England's
Road to Social Security 26 (1943); a more authoritative treatment is to be
found in S. and B. Webb, English Local Government: English Poor Law History: Part I, The Old Poor Law (1927).

'Op.

cit.,supra, note 2.
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found in most state general assistance laws.4 Later the formal adoption of the English common law by most American states, resulted
in the common law concept of the right to public aid being followed
in the United States.
The cases discussed below show the relative unanimity with
which American courts have followed the English common law
rule concerning the right to publ'c assistance.
In a 1911 decision the Iowa Supreme Court had occasion to
reiterate the rule that support of the poor was not a municipal
function at common law. It found that, by ordinance of the "ancient kings," the poor were to be supported by parsons, church
rectors, and by parishioners until, about the time of Henry VIII,
the law made paupers a charge on certain municipalities. The
court then held, under the facts of the case, that in the absence
of a positive legislative enactment, no obligation rested on a municipality to pay expenses incurred for aid to the needy. No duty
could be implied since a municipal corporation was not legally or
morally obligated to care for the poor. Since the duty is created
only by an affirmative statute, it cannot be carried farther than
the express provisions of the poor laws. Cerro Gordo County v.
Boone County.5 In an early Colorado case the Supreme Court gave
adherence to the general rule that paupers could not be considered "public charges" unless expressly made such by statute.
County of Saguache v. Tough.6 In a Washington case an amendment to the Mother's Pension Act, which restricted coverage under
the law, was challenged on constitutional grounds. The court upheld the statute indicating that no legal obligation rested on the
state to assist the indigent. Since the state is not an obligor, it
may care for the needy in any manner it pleases. No individual
or class can acquire a vested right to be cared for in any particular manner. There is therefore no duty that can be enforced in
law. Such relief as the state does provide is legally in the nature
of a largess or bounty which may be discontinued at the legislative
will. In re Snyder.7 During the great depression of the thirties
an applicant for poor relief in Douglas County, Nebraska, sought
a peremptory writ of mandamus, requiring the county commissioners to provide aid for his family and all other poor and destitute
persons similarly situated. Apparently uninfluenced by the exist' Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 685-689 (1950); Abbott,
Public Assistance 7 (1940). As suggested above, state general assistance statutes developed from the Elizabethan Poor Law. Under such laws aid is extended
to needy persons in general. The special or categorical assistance programs,
under the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A., Sec. 301-306; 601-606; 12011206; and 1351-1355) and implementing state laws, provide aid to designated
classes of needy persons, such as the aged, dependent children, the blind, and
the permanently and totally disabled. The latter laws, because of the many procedural protections accorded claimants, represent a striking departure from
traditional poor law philosophy.
152 Iowa 692, 133 N. W. 132, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 161 (1911).
645
Colo. 395, 101 P. 411 (1909).
160 P. 13 (1916).
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ing emergency, the court followed the general rule that there was
no common law liability upon any government unit to assist indigent persons. The court specifically held that the liability if any,
must arise by virtue of statutes making it the duty of the county.
Hence paupers were not public charges unless made so by statute.
State ex rel. Boxberger v. Burns, et al.8 In People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 9 the Illinois court denied that any governmental
unit had a common law duty to aid persons without means of support. Apart from a duty created by statute, the court could discern no legal obligation resting upon either the state or local units
to assist the needy. For additional cases in accord see Town of
Morristown v. Town of Hardwick,1 ° Town2 of Clearwater v. Town
1
Patrick v. Town of Baldwin.1
ofGarfield,"
With the enactment by Congress in 1935 of the Social Security
Act the era of modern public assistance legislation in the United
States began.1 3 Under the stimulus of Federal grants in aid, the
states rapidly passed laws, in conformity with the Federal act,
providing public aid for the needy aged, blind, and dependent children. These laws, with their provisions for operation of the programs on a uniform state-wide basis, confidentiality of assistance
records, payment in cash, and the opportunity for a fair hearing
before the state administrative agency, represented a striking departure from the early poor laws.
Despite the new substantive and procedural rights conferred
by the Social Security Act upon defined classes of the needy, the
courts continued to regard the right to public aid as purely statutory and therefore in the nature of a gratuity from the sovereign.
One authority has suggested, in explanation of the unchanged judicial attitude, that the draftsmen of the Federal law did not
believe it necessary to require, as a condition of the Federal grant,
that the implementing state law declare the existence of a legal
right. This belief being based on the assumption that the rights
created by the Social Security Act automatically became subject
to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 As is well known by
specialists in this field, cases decided after the enactment of the
Social Security Act have shown this assumption to be an untenabre
one. While many recent cases can be cited in support of this conclusion, a representative selection should suffice for the purpose
of this analysis.
Following the adoption of the basic Washington old-age assistance act, the Washington court interpreted the act as entitling
N. W. 656 (1937).
Ill. 557, 30 N. E. (2d) 46, 50, 132 A.L.R. 511.
Vt. 31, 69 A. 152.
Neb. 697, 91 N. W. 496.
12109 Wis. 342, 85 N. W. 274, 53 L.R.A. 613.
" 42 U. S. C. A., Sec. 301-306; 601-606; and 1201-1206.
"4 A. Delafield Smith, "Public Assistance As a Social Obligation," 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 266, 268.
'270
'374
1081
" 65
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a designated class of persons to claim benefits from the State. Such
entitlement, however, did no more than confer a statutory privilege. If the privilege was to be dignified by being called a right,
it was one that was subject to legislative abrogation. Consequently
it was not to be considered a vested right in the sense that it was
property or a right that had become fixed in such manner that
the beneficiary could not be deprived of it without his consent.
Adams v. Ernst, Director of Social Security et al.15 In the case of
Creighton v. Pope County, 16 the Illinois court made it clear, by
way of dictum, that the general rule would not be applicable to
rights which had vested because of contributions paid under a
pension law into a pension fund. If, as in the instant case, the
right to the pension rested on no more basis than a claim to the
state's bounty under an assistance statute, such right was not a
vested one and the payment was no more than gratuity. For additional recent authorities on the general rules see Howlett v. State
Commission,1 7 Chapman v. State Social Security
Social Security
Commission,'8 Hardy v. State Social Security Commission,19 and
20
Hart v. Grays Harbor County.
In the decided cases, where the nature of the right to receive
aid has been an issue, the courts are as one in declaring that such
right is a bounty or a privilege. Nevertheless, there are holdings
by a few courts which suggest an inclination to traverse new
pathways.
In Bowman v. Frost,2" the court dealt with the contention that
the aid to the blind statute violated the constitutional prohibition
against the grant of exclusive public emoluments or privileges to
axqy man or set of men. The act was held valid since the prohibition did not apply to cases where a payment is made to satisfy an
"inherent duty." When the legislature makes a commitment by
statute to assume an obligation the right of the person coming
within the statute attaches. The aid extended to the eligible needy
person is not a mere gift or bounty, but is a payment in discharge
of a public duty owed by society.
While the Kentucky court gave no authority for its holding
that public aid under a statute was not a gift, the case may well
become a landmark for the developing law of the future. On this
assumption it may be worthwhile to examine the reasoning by
which the court reached its conclusion. The court conceded that
at common law the state had no duty to assist the underprivileged.
It agreed that the legal right to apply for and receive public aid
derived from the statute. Query, if no legal duty antecedent to a
statute exists, in what sense was the court using the concepts of
1'1

Wash. (2d) 254, 95 P. (2d) 799.
6386 Ill. 468, 54 N. E. (2d) 543, 153 A.L.R. 802.
347 Mo. 784, 149 S. W. (2d) 806.
," 235 Mo. 698, 147 S. W. (2d) 157.
9187 S. W. (2d) 520.
'86 P. (2d) 198.
"289 Ky. 826, 158 S. W. (2d) 945.
1
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"inherent duty" and "public duty"? When the opinion is read as
a whole these concepts become less obscure. A civilized society
develops through time a sense of obligation toward its needy members. This sense of duty becomes more pervasive through the social
fabric. Organized society eventually recognizes a right in its dependent members. It is then that the community by statute makes
a commitment that none of its members shall suffer when in need.
In a mandamus proceeding the California State Board of
Social Welfare sought to compel the county of Los Angeles to
make certain payments of public aid retroactively. In one of three
factual situations, the recipient of old-age assistance had requested
an administrative hearing before the State Board for the reason
that he believed himself entitled to a larger payment than he had
been receiving. Before the hearing was held, the county agency
redetermined the recipient's need and paid an increased amount
as of the date of the redetermination. When the hearing was held
by the state agency, the county representative conceded that the
initial determination had been incorrect but denied the authority
of the State Board to order payment of the proper amount on a
retroactive basis. Under these facts, the court unequivocally found
a duty to pay which accrued as of the date the applicant was first
entitled to receive payment. This duty to pay was the equivalent
of a debt due from the county to the applicant. In another situation the county asserted that the payment of aid retroactively to
the estate of the deceased recipient would constitute an unlawful
gift of public money. The court resolved this issue by ruling that
while the assistance law makes the right to recive aid personal
and inalienable, it nevertheless does not preclude the residue of
assistance remaining after payment, or the right to receive aid
which has accrued from being subject to devolution as a common
incident of the recipient's
property right. Board of Social Welfare
22
v. Los Angeles County.
II.

PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BY STATUTE

There is little direct authority on the validity of statutes which
directly or by implication curtail judicial review of public aid
agency decisions. In lieu of specific authority, it seems appropriate to cite cases affecting other administrative agencies where
the agency involved was administering a benefactory program and
the program has been considered by the courts as coming within
the classification of a gratuity, privilege, or self-imposed claim.
In an Oklahoma case the court upheld the constitutionality of
the old-age assistance law which made the decision of the County
Assistance Board and the Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission
final on questions of fact. The court declared that whenever a
government, as a matter of grace, provides for giving a gratuity
or bounty within the terms of a statute, it has full power to confer
authority on the administrative agency to determine whether the
2227 Cal. (2d)

81, 162 P. (2d) 630.
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terms specified have been met as a matter of fact and to deny resort to judicial review as a matter of right. No constitutional issue
arises if the method for determining facts is a reasonable one and
such method applies to all alike. The court went on to observe that
no provision of the Federal Constitution prevented administrative
agencies being vested with power to make final decisions on legal
questions. State ex
rel. Westbrook v. Oklahoma Public Welfare
23
Commission et al.
As the statute in the Oklahoma case did not purport to foreclose an appeal to the courts on an issue of law, the point last mentioned in the opinion was clearly dictum. Since as dictum the
statement is unsupported by legal reasoning, the conclusion is not
wholly persuasive.
In Helms v. Alabama Pension Commission,24 the Pension Commission had removed the petitioner's name from the list of confederate veterans eligible for a pension. Although the enabling
act made no provision for an administrative hearing or for court
review of agency decisions, the pensioner pursued various administrative and legal remedies seeking to be restored to the pension
roll and to have back payments allowed. In the state Supreme
Court the constitutionality of the pension law was assailed as not
meeting the requirements of procedural due process. However,
this argument was rejected by the court which held that where
a bounty or gratuity is involved due process does not require that
notice and a hearing be given by the commission. On the same
premise, the legislature might pursue its own course in setting
up methods for the final determination of eligibility under the
program. When the legislature creates claims of this type it is
not obligated to provide a remedy by judicial review of fact findings made by the administrative agency.
The rationale of the Helms decision strongly suggests that due
process does not prevent the legislature from making the decision
of the Pension Commission final on questions of law as well as
fact. Yet the court's actual holding made it clear that denial of
judicial review would be limited to fact issues. While the reasons
for this limitation were not articulated, it seems reasonable to
infer that the court was reluctant to reach a harsh though logical
result on the basis of a statute that was silent as to the legislative
intention.
In a Federal case the United States Supreme Court found no
constitutional question arising under a Congressional statute which
conferred final adjudicatory power upon the administrative agency.
The statute permitted certain claims by service personnel for personal property losses incident to military service to be reimbursed
by the government upon approval by the Treasury Department.
It was expressly stipulated that the decision of the department on
such claims was to be final and not subject to appeal. The court,
167 P. (2d) 71.
-4231 Ala. 183, 163 So. 805, 163 So. 807 (1935).
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speaking through Justice Brandeis, laid down the rule that where
the United States imposes claims upon itself through creation of
rights in individuals, it is not required to provide a judicial remedy. In instances where rights are created by a statute which provides a special remedy, such remedy is exclusive. If the provision
as to the right and the remedy stood alone, however, we would
not necessarily hold that the remedy excluded judicial review in
situations where the administrative agency's decision involved
no issue of fact and the denial of the claim was based upon an
interpretation of the statute. In the instant case the statute expressly provided "that any claim which shall be presented and
acted on . . . shall be held as finally determined, and shall never
thereafter be reopened or considered." These words clearly show
an intention to confer upon the Treasury an exclusive jurisdiction
25
and to accord finality to the decision. U. S. v. Babcock.
The Babcock case thus seems to stand for the proposition that
when Congress gratuitously grants certain rights to individuals
it can expressly make an agency's adjudication upon these rights
final both on matters of fact and of law. The facts of the case
show that the claimants appealed the disallowance of their claims
by the Auditor of the War Department, and were accorded a hearing before the Comptroller General of the Treasury Department.
Yet it is not clear from the opinion whether the decision turned
on these facts. It remains an open question, therefore, whether
Congress could go so far as to make an agency's decision on a
claim of this type final as to the law and the facts and at the same
time deny the aggrieved claimant both the right to an administrative hearing and access to the courts.
In Silberschein v. U. S.,26 the question arose as to whether
decisions of the Veterans' Bureau upon claims for compensation
under the War Risk Insurance Act were subject to judicial review.
Administration of the act was vested in the director of the Veterans' Bureau who was given express authority to make rules
necessary for the enforcement of the law and to decide all questions
arising under the act. The petitioner's compensation for physical
disability had been first reduced by the agency and then completely
revoked for the reason that his disability had ceased to be compensable. In his action against the agency, the petitioner alleged
that the decision was arbitrary and contrary to the weight of evidence in his case. In ruling adversely to these contentions, the
Supreme Court held that the statute, which created the assertdd
right, authorized the director to decide all questions under it and
his decision of such questions was conclusive and not subject to
judicial review unless the determination was found to be "wholly
unsupported by the evidence, or is wholly dependent upon a question of law or is seen to be clearly arbitrary or capricious."
It should be noted here that the rule in the Silberschein case
-250 U. S. 328, 39 S. Ct. 464 (1918).
- 266 U. S. 221, 45 S. Ct. 69 (1924).
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is not inconsistent with that of the Babcock case. In the Babcock
case the court held that Congress, by the compelling language of
a particular statute, clearly showed an intent to foreclose resort
to the courts on an issue of law. In the Silberschein case the court
could find no such compelling language in the statute.
with the rule ofFor further Supreme Court cases in accord
Crouch v. U. S., 2 7 U. S. v. Williams,2
the Silberschein case see
9
and Meadows v. U. S.2
In Lynch v. U. S.,30 the court decided that Congress by enacting section 17 of the Economy Act 11 had abrogated the contractual
rights of the beneficiaries under certain renewable term government life insurance contracts in violation of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. In deciding this question, the court
observed that Congress by section 5 of the Act had authorized the
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to make final decisions on all
issues of law and fact arising from claims by veterans to pensions,
compensation allowances, and other special privileges. Section 5
thus had nothing to do with War Risk Insurance, and was intended
to deny judicial relief even under the exceptional circumstances
suggested in the Silberschein, Williams, and Meadows cases.
The constitutionality of section 5 was not before the court,
and its review provisions were clearly collateral to the issue raised
by section 17 of the Economy Act. It would therefore seem that
the comments of the court on section 5 were essentially dicta.
A case decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals involved
an appeal from a decision of the Veterans' Bureau to decrease
a sum due on a War Risk policy because of excess awards previously paid in error. One of the grounds on which the administrative action was challenged was that the decision was made without notice or hearing. The statute under which the erroneous
awards had been made denied resort to the courts and made the
decisions of the Veterans' agency conclusive on both the facts and
the law. The court conceded that at one time the rule prevailed
that judicial review was possible when a decision was arbitrary
or capricious, wholly unsupported by the evidence, or wholly dependent upon a question of law. This is the rule set out in Siberschein v. U. S.32 It then pointed out that section 5 of the Economy
Act did away with judicial review even where such special circumstances were present. For this interpretation of section 5,
Lynch v. U. S., 33 was cited. U. S. v. Mroch 4
It is submitted here that the Lynch case is not an actual departure from the rule of the Silberschein case. Both cases can be
266 U. S. 180, 45 S. Ct. 71 (1924).
'-278 U. S. 255, 49 S. Ct. 97 (1929).
"281 U. S. 271, 50 S. Ct. 279 (1929).
'0292 U. S. 571 (1933).
1 38 U. S. C. A.. sec. 705.
"266 U. S. 221.
=292 U. S. 571.
m88 F. (2d) 888 (1937).
2

May, 1954

DICTA

reconciled with each other just as the early Babcock case is reconcilable with the Silberschein case. The apparent difference on
one hand between the Babcock and Lynch cases and the Silberschein case on the other derives from a difference in the facts. The
rule governing all these cases is that where Congress imposes
claims upon the United States by creating rights in individuals,
it has constitutional power to make the agency's adjudication upon
these rights conclusive on matters of fact and of law. The courts,
however, will not interpret a statute as making the agency's adjudication of a legal question final unless Congress has manifested
its intent by unequivocal language.3 Access to the courts in the
Silberschein case was regarded as still open on a legal issue because Congress failed to use compelling language to show its intent.
The later case of Dismuke v. U. S.36 reaffirms the rule of the
Babcock case and furnishes some authority for the interpretation
made just above. In the Dismuke case the petitioner had filed a
claim with the Veterans' agency for a retirement annuity based
on an alleged thirty year period of Federal service. The agency
disallowed his claim on the ground that employment as a field
deputy United States marshal could not be counted as service as
an employee of the United States. The petitioner then obtained
a judgment in the district court permitting a recovery of accrued
installments of the annuity. The judgment was then reversed by
the Court of Appeals on the basis that the district court was without jurisdiction because section 13 of the Retirement Act, which
declares that upon receipt of satisfactory evidence the Commissioner of Pensions shall forthwith adjudicate the applicant's claim,
must be construed as vesting the adjudication of claims under it
solely in the administrative agency, and to the exclusion of the
courts. When the case came to the Supreme Court on certiorari,
the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, not for the reason
given by that court, but for the reason that a field deputy United
States marshal was not considered to be an employee of the United
States within the meaning of the Retirement Act. It is clear from
the Supreme Court's opinion that little weight was attached to
the government's contention that the Retirement Act, by implication, forbids employees to assert in the courts rights acquired
under it. The United States is not, the court declared, by the creation of claims against itself, obliged to provide a remedy in the
courts. It may elect to withhold all remedy or it may provide an
administrative remedy and make it exclusive, however erroneous
its exercise. But, in the absence of compelling language, access to
the courts to assert a right which the statute creates will be deemed
to be curtailed only so far as express authority is given to the
' Justice Frankfurter has suggested that the court's construction of these
statutes shows its consistent respect for due process in its "basic meaning" even
where the distribution of government benefits is concerned. See his concurring
opinion in Joint Anti Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 167, 71
S. Ct. 624, 645-646.
297 U. S. 167, 172, 56 S. Ct. 400 (1936).
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administrative officer. Hence, if such officer is authorized to de-

cide question of fact, his decision is final unless he exceeds his
authority by making a decision which is arbitrary or capricious
or unsupported by evidence; or has departed from a procedure
which satisfies elementary standards of -fairness and reasonableness essential to the conduct of the proceeding authorized by
Congress.
It is clear from the court's opinion in the Dismuke case, that
if the Retirement Act had expressly authorized the administrative
officer to make ultimate decisions on issues of law such a provision would have raised no constitutional question. It thereby appears that the court's opinion in the recent Dismuke case is consistent with its earlier opinion in the Babcock case.
For lower Federal court decisions in accord with the dictum
in the Lynch case, see 39Barnett v. Hines,37 Van Home v. Hines,38
and Calderon v. Tobin.
The rule discussed above has been the subject of vigorous
criticism by commentators in the field of administrative law.
Kenneth Culp Davis has cogently argued that a procedure which
the courts regard as a violation of fair play when used to impose
a penalty does not become fair when used to withdraw a benefit.
He therefore recommends that when an agency decision, regardless
of program, involves disputed facts as to an individual-his qualifications, circumstances or past conduct-that individual should
be given an opportunity to know the evidence adverse to his interest and to meet it with evidence and argument. 40 Another writer
contends that it is unrealistic under contemporary conditions to
treat the applicant for a government pension, whose very livelihood may depend upon the receipt of the pension, differently from
one who is said to be injured in his personal or property rights.
The fact that the state may legally withhold a privilege or a pension by repeal of the enabling law should not mean that the agency
can arbitrarily deny the claims of particular individuals without
the claimant
being entitled to a court review upon the legality of
41
the denial.
In 1946 the Assistant General Counsel of the Federal Security
Agency, impressed by the state of decisional law and the omission
of declarations of rights from state public aid statutes, made certain suggestions as to how the legal claim to social benefits might
be made more effective. He urged that declaratory statements
should be written into the statutes which should expressly and
specifically affirm "that the benefit is not to be construed as a
gratuity but as the creation of a right socially and economically
105 F. (2d) 96 (1939).
122 F. (2d) 207 (1941).
'187 F. (2d) 514 (1951).
Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative Process," 51 Yale L. J. 1093 at 1123 (1942).
1,Schwartz, "Administrative Law: 1942-1951," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775, at 843844 (1953).
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justified and subject to judicial review and interpretation and to
the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and equal protection of law as any other right." 42 In another article the same
writer pointed out that the enforceability of justiciable rights to
public aid was essentially dependent on the fiscal implementation
of the program. Therefore, even where an assistance statute included provisions necessary to the establishment of such rights,
the legislature might fail to set aside funds to carry out the program, or to appropriate funds adequate to maintain the standard
defined by the statute. Because of these contingencies, Smith recommends that the right to assistance should be defined as a general charge upon the state treasury and supported by a permanent
appropriation. To avoid the risk of unpredictable drafts upon the
general fund, the provisions establishing the assistance program
should be drafted
so as to define a determinate undertaking on an
43
objective basis.
III.

REVIEW IN THE ABSENCE OF A STATUTE

Ordinarily in the absence of a statutory review procedure,
claimants aggrieved by agency decisions will seek to have a court
review-the agency's action through mandamus proceedings. 44 Litigants invoke this proceeding by addressing a petition to a court
of competent jurisdiction, requesting that a writ of mandamus be
issued, and alleging that a certain public official has failed to
perform some public duty which the petitioner is entitled of right
to have performed. The writ, if issued, takes the form of an order
commanding the official to whom it is addressed to perform the
duty which the official heretofore has failed to perform. 45 The
courts, in passing upon such petitions, refuse or issue the writ
in accordance with certain rules of administrative law. These
rules briefly stated are that mandamus is a proper remedy for
commanding acts of a ministerial nature, for ordering the exercise
of official discretion when the official fails to act, and for preventing abuse of discretion, but not for controlling the manner in
which discretion is exercised. Also, in many jurisdictions mandamus has been denied on the ground of availability
and adequacy
46
of non-statutory or statutory review procedures.
As decisions in a public aid program usually involve the exercise of discretion, it is evident that the rules on the availability
of mandamus tend to restrict the number of court appeals by
41A. Delfield Smith, "Community Prerogative and the Legal Rights and
Freedom of the Individual," 1946 Proceedings of the National Conference of
Social Work 100.
"Op. cit., supra, note 14, p. 268.
" Certiorari is not a practical remedy for the review of administrative action.
Almost all authorities agree that certiorari is not available for the review of
non-judicial action. See Davis, Administrative Law 779.
'The People Ex Rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30 N. E. (2d) 46,
132 A.L.R. 511.
Davis, Administrative Law 768-772.
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public aid claimants. Other problems arising from the use of this
remedy stem from the inherent difficulty of deciding what duties
are ministerial or discretionary, and what is an abuse of discretion.
The cases discussed below would seem to bear out these conclusions.
A Montana recipient of old-age assistance sought a writ of
mandamus to obtain a restoration of the total amount by which
his former assistance payments had been reduced and to prevent
the agency from continuing to make payments in reduced amounts.
The court refused the petition for the following reasons. An
appropriation in a fixed amount had been apportioned to the State
Board to operate on for a definite period. It then became the
board's duty under the statute to adopt a policy which would best
serve the purpose of the old-age assistance program within the
means furnished for that purpose. Whether it would be wiser for
the agency to make full payments and prematurely expend most
of the appropriation, or whether the recipients now qualified to
receive payments, and the ever increasing number of applicants
who may qualify later, would be more equitably assisted by a prorata decrease in payments, is wholly a question of administrative
discretion vested exclusively by the legislature in the board. It
is not a proper judicial function for a court to interfere with such
discretionary actions of the agency, where it appears that it is
acting within the
scope of its authority. State ex rel. Dean v.
47
Brandjord et al.
Under facts similar to the Brandjord case, a Colorado recipient petitioned the District Court for a writ of mandamus commanding the agency to certify old-age pensions to the state auditor on
the basis of $45 monthly, regardless of available funds. The district court issued the writ requested by the petitioner's prayer,
and the agency appealed the judgment to the Colorado Supreme
Court. On appeal the sole issue before the court was whether or
not the agency had authority to pro-rate assistance payments when
available funds proved insufficient to meet the needs of qualified
claimants. The court declared that if the administrative agency
could not properly pro-rate payments, no other body might. Only
clerical duties, devoid of any element of discretion, had been conferred upon the state auditor and state treasurer. If the agency
could not pro-rate then the full amounts must be certified and the
rule "first come first served" applies. Under this rule the fund
is quickly expended and late comers take nothing, a plain violation
of the constitutional prohibition against discrimination. Upholding the constitutional prohibition would vitiate the $45 per month
provision; upholding the latter would nullify the prohibition against
discrimination at the expense of those probably most needy. In
this emergency, we have no trouble in finding an implied authority
to pro-rate. First, that authority is vested in the agency or is
not vested; second, said chapter 201 (1937 Colorado Session Laws;
4192 P.

(2d) 273 (1939).
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old-age pension enabling statute) must be construed as legislation
implementing said chapter 200 (Article XXIV, Colorado Constitution, pertaining to old-age pension) ; third, said chapter 200
(section 4) expressly limits the agency, in making payments, to
"moneys deposited in the old-age pension fund." It has nothing
to do with moneys not so deposited. Fourth, discrimination is
forbidden; fifth, since errors, if any, made by the county boards,
must be corrected before certification, "the amounts approved,"
as specified in section 19 (chapter 201, 1937 Colorado Session
Laws), must mean the payments approved by the state agency,
and it is only such amounts that are to be certified and paid, and
those are to be paid only "from moneys appropriated." The conclusion is then irresistible that authority to pro-rate is by necessary implication conferred upon the state agency. On the basis
of this conclusion the
judgment of the district court is reversed.
48
Fairall v. Redmon .
In Colorado Public Welfare Board v. Viles, 49 the petitioner
made application to the county director for aid to the blind. His
application was then considered by the local board which determined that the applicant was eligible except that they "did not
believe the reports of the three opthalmologists . . . ." Aid to
the blind was thereupon denied. Obtaining no relief after an administrative hearing, the petitioner made out an alternative writ
of mandamus directed to the state agency. The District Court
granted the petition and ordered the agency to pay a blind pension of $30.00 a month. The state agency then appealed to the
Supreme Court. The appellate court met the argument that no
statutory review is provided, by holding that the district courts
under their general jurisdiction and the Supreme Court by writ
of error under its constitutional powers may review the decisions
of any agency where it is alleged that legal rights have been denied
or that the agency is vested with a discretion which it refuses to
exercise. However, the mandate of the District Court as directed
to the Public Welfare Board should have required the agency to
consider the facts and to act. In modifying the judgment of the
lower court the court observed:
The refusal of the Board to exercise discretion neither
vested the court with the discretion nor entitled plaintiff to the maximum [payment]. The mandate should
have been to act.
The plaintiff in a Federal case sued the Veterans Bureau for
accrued disability compensation payments, payable under an award,
in the amount of $3,000 plus interest. The district court dismissed
the suit and on appeal the Fourth tcircuit Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal. The court observed that if the petitioner's
contention, that the agency's award fixed the right to compensa48
4

107 Colo. 195, 110 P. (2d) 247.
105 Colo. 62, 94 P. (2d) 713.
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tion so that no discretion to withhold payment remained, is correct,
a proper remedy was not a suit against the United States to adjudicate a liability which had already been determined by the bureau
but a suit against the bureau director for a writ of mandamus to
require him, as the officer charged with the duty of making the
payment, to discharge the duty. Smith v. United States.50
In State ex rel. Westbrook v. Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission et al,51 an old-age assistance recipient's name was removed
by the agency from the list of eligible recipients. The recipient
Westbrook then demanded that his name be restored to the list.
Following the rejection of his demand by the agency, Westbrook
petitioned for a writ of mandamus so as to have the agency's action
overruled. Westbrook's petition was thereupon dismissed by the
trial court which upheld the agency's argument that the assistance
law made the agency's decisons final on questions of fact and that
no court had authority to review its determinations or weigh the
evidence. On appeal to the appellate court, the petitioner conceded
that the statute made the agency's decision final on issues of fact.
However, this admission was used as the premise for the contention that the petitioner was without an adequate remedy and
therefore entitled to apply for the extraordinary writ of mandamus. The Oklahoma Supreme Court was not persuaded by this
ingenious argument and ruled adversely to Westbrook. It specifically held that mandamus was not a proper remedy unless there
is a clear legal right for which the law provides no remedy; or
if there is arbitrary or capricious action in the guise of the exercise of discretion that amounts to an abuse of discretion. On
review of the record, the court concluded that it would support
an eligibility decision of approval or denial. For this reason there
was no abuse of discretion by the agency.
The Helms case, previously discussed under topic II, also raised
a question as to the availability of mandamus. Pursuant to a
recommendation of the county grand jury, the Pension Commission removed pensioner Helms' name from the roll of eligible confederate veterans. Helms then applied to the county probate judge
for a correction of the agency's alleged erroneous decision. The
probate judge, after investigating the facts, certified to the commission that Helms' name should be reinstated on the pension roll
and payments allowed back to the date of his removal from the
roll. The Pension Commission thereupon considered the certification and decided that its decision to disallow should stand unchanged. Helms now sought and obtained a writ of mandamus,
in the Court of Appeals, commanding the commission to restore
him to the roll and allow back pay. The commission appealed this
judgment to the Supreme Court which ruled adversely to the
-'57 F. (2d) 998, 999 (1932).
"167 P. (2d) 71.
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petitioner. In reversing the judgment, the court noted that the
commission had considered several factors pertaining to the petitioner's claim in addition to the certificate of the probate judge.
If the agency had been bound by the certificate and was without
discretion, the petitioner clearly would be entitled to the writ. But
the agency was not so bound and could properly make an independent investigation of the facts. Consequently the administrative decision on this claim was based on discretion and judgment.
A decision, authorized to be reached in this manner, is not subject
to modification by mandamus or other judicial review unless the
decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence, wholly dependent
upon a question of law, or is seen to be clearly 52arbitrary or capricious. Helms v. Alabama Pension Commission.
In a South Dakota case a claimant for old-age assistance was
found ineligible by the agency on the basis that he had been receiving support from relatives. The claimant thereupon petitioned
for a writ of mandamus commanding the State Social Security
Commission to approve his application for old-age assistance. The
trial court granted the writ and the agency appealed. On appeal
the appellants did not rely on the usual rules for refusing mandamus but contended that when the legislature created claims
against the state in the nature of gratuities it thereby intended
to eliminate court appeals and to limit appeals by dissatisfied claimants to an administrative hearing before the administrative
agency. The court rejected this interpretation of the statute and
held that since the legislature had not manifested an intention to
give the agency complete discretion in administering the old-age
assistance program and although the statute contained no express
provision for judicial review, it could not find any indication of
an intent to eliminate appropriate judicial remedies. The court
then cited the Dismuke case as authority for its interpretation.
Wood v. Waggoner.53 (Note previous discussion of Dismuke case
under topic II of this article.)

BOOKTRADERS CORNER
F. Wesley Cowell, 821 West 8th Ave., has Volumes 1-45 of
the Colorado Reports for sale. If interested he may be reached
at KE 1662.
We have an immediate need for Volumes 90-104 of the Colorado Reports. Anyone knowing where these may be obtained
kindly call Acoma 2-9421.

231 Ala. 183, 163 So. 805, 163 So. 807 (1935).
N. V. 188 (1940).

.3293

DICTA

May, 1954

CASE COMMENTS
EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
BY WIRETAPPING-In a recent United States Supreme Court
case, Schwartz v. Texas,' the petitioner, a pawnbroker, became
involved in a conspiracy with two men, one named Jarrett and
the other named Bennett. The latter two were to rob certain people and, according to the plan, were to bring the loot to the petitioner who was to dispose of it and divide the proceeds.
Pursuant to the plan a woman was robbed of some valuable
jewels. The petitioner, after disposing of the jewels, repeatedly
delayed settlement with the robbers and the three finally fell out.
The petitioner then tipped off the police as to where they could
find Jarrett. After Jarrett had been in jail about two weeks he
consented to telephone the petitioner from the sheriff's office. With
the knowledge and consent of Jarrett a professional operator set
up an induction coil connected to a recorder amplifier thereby enabling the operator to overhear and record the conversation between Jarrett and the petitioner. These records were used as
evidence when the petitioner was convicted as an accomplice to
the crime of robbery. The records, admitted only after Jarrett
and the petitioner had testified, corroborated Jarrett and discredited the petitioner.
Seven members of the court, with Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurring in a separate opinion and Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, held that the federal prohibition of the unauthorized interception of a telephone communication does not bar the use of such
communications as evidence in a criminal proceeding in a state
court. This is true irrespective of whether the state rule admitting
such evidence is established by the legislature or the courts.
The pertinent part of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act is as follows:
. . . no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. .
This has been construed by the United States Supreme Court
to render inadmissible in any federal court intercepted communications when such communication is sought to be divulged in
violation of the act.3 It was later held that4 this rule applied even
though the telephone calls were intrastate.
-

Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199, 73 S. Ct. 232, 97 L. Ed. 231 (Dec., 1952).
47 U.S.C. Section 605.

Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321 (1939).
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A similar rule was laid down by the United States Supreme
Court regarding unlawful searches and seizures under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The court held
that evidence obtained by a state officer, by means which would
constitute an unlawful seach and seizure, is nonetheless admissible in a state court 5 even though it had been established that evidence obtained by such means would clearly 6be inadmissible in
a federal court under the Fourth Amendment.
In the Schwartz case the state rule admitting the wiretapping
evidence was established by statute.7 The statute, as amended,
rendered inadmissible in criminal trials evidence obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of Texas or of any provision of
the Federal Constitution. This statute did not cover evidence obtained in violation of the laws (as distinguished from the Constitution) of the United States. Colorado apparently has no such
statutory rule of evidence to bring it within the rule approved in
the Schwartz case.
Colorado does have a statute which makes it a misdemeanor
to tap a telephone or telegraph line. The pertinent part of this
statute states:
Any person who cuts, breaks, taps or makes any connection with any telegraph or telephone line, wire, cable
or instrument belonging to another, and wilfully reads,
takes or copies any message, communication or report
intended for another passing over any such telegraph
or telephone line, wire, or cable in this state . . . shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."
In Colorado, therefore, we are governed by a statute which
brings about the same result as the Texas statute, in that it prohibits the obtaining of evidence by wiretapping, but does not render such evidence inadmissible in the state courts. The Supreme
Court makes it clear that the rule of the Schwartz case, in the
absence of a direct expression by Congress, is simply an additional
factor for a state to consider in formulating a rule of evidence
for use in its own courts. The Colorado Supreme Court has not
had an opportunity to specifically rule upon the admissibility of
evidence obtained by wiretapping. However, the court has held
on several occasions that evidence illegally taken from a person
against whom it is offered or otherwise unlawfully obtained is
nonetheless admissible if pertinent to the issue.9 It is reasonable
to assume that the rule would be followed in a case involving wiretapping and that evidence so obtained would be amissible in crimiWolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
'Tex. Laws, 1925, Ch. 49, Sec. 1.
1935 C.S.A., Chap. 48, Sec. 129.
'Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P. (2d) 926; Massantonio v. People, 77
Colo. 392, 236 P. 1019.
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nal trials in the Colorado courts even though the act be a flagrant
violation of the Federal Communications Act and the Colorado
statute. 10 It is also reasonable to assume that in a prosecution in
a state court for a state crime, the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution would not forbid the admission of relevant
evidence even though obtained by a violation of Section 11605 of
the Federal Communications Act or the Colorado statute.
After a careful look at the Schwartz case, it is apparent that
a state may still enact a law which prohibits the obtaining of wiretapping evidence and yet the state criminal courts can admit such
illegally obtained evidence without violating the laws or Constitution of the United States. The United States Supreme Court
in support of this reasoning said,
Where a state has carefully legislated so as not to
render inadmissible evidence obtained and sought to be
divulged in violation of the laws of the United States,
this court will not extend by implication the statute of
the United States so as to invalidate the specific language
of the state statute. If Congress is authorized to act in
a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will
not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to
supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless
there is a clear manifestation to do so.12
It is clear that Congress has not manifested an intent to supersede the exercised power of a state in this matter, so to this date
there is nothing that would bar a state from enacting and enforcing such legislation.
It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that the United States
Supreme Court did not decide whether or not Congress has the
power to impose a rule of evidence on the courts of a state.
DWIGHT A. HAMILTON.
WRONGFUL DEATH: MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR
DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD-The case of McEntyre v. Jones'
was brought in Conejos County by the mother of a deceased thirteen year old girl. The facts were in dispute, but the jury found
that the defendant wife had negligently driven the defendants'
truck against the girl, causing her death. Judgment was entered
on a verdict of $7,500 for the plaintiff, and the defendants bring
error. Affirmed.
The defendants assert that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the measurement of damages. The instruc" Hubin v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A. (2d) 706; People v. Stemmer, 298 N. Y.
728, 83 N. E. (2d) 141; Harlem v. Bell, 296 N. Y. 15, 68 N. E. (2d) 854;_People
v. Channell, 101 Cal. App. (2d) 192, 236 P. (2d) 654.
11Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199 (Dec., 1952).
- Colo. -, 263 P. (2d) 313 (1953), 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 5, p. 97.
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tion was, in part, "In assessing the plaintiff's damages, if any,
you should consider the age, health and condition of life of her
deceased daughter, her habits of industry, her ability to earn
money, her disposition to aid and assist the plaintiff, and the
probable duration of the life of the plaintiff and of her deceased
daughter, if she had not died as a result of the accident." The
Supreme Court holds that the instruction was proper-that damages should be measured by the life expectancy of the deceased
child limited to the life expectancy of the beneficiary mother, and
not limited to the years of minority of the child.
The cases of Pierce v. Conners 2 and Tadlock v. Lloyd 3 were
contra to this case and expressly limited recovery to the prospective net pecuniary loss during the years of the deceased child's
minority.
The cases of Lehrer v. Lorenzen 4 and St. Lukes Hospital Association v. Long 5 accord with the present case though not expressly so. In both cases the Supreme Court found that the instructions as to the measurement of damages were proper. The
instruction in the Lehrer case suggested that the jury take "into
consideration the child's disposition and ability to contribute to
the parents' wants and necessities during their probable duration
of life." The instruction in the St. Lukes Hospital case was almost
identical to the instruction given in the present case. Both of
these instructions indicated that recovery was not to be limited
to the years of minority of the deceased child. However, in neither
case was the Court called upon to decide the exact point.
In the present case, the Court finds that the law in Colorado
upon this question has been changed by the above mentioned
cases; and the only further justification given for this change is
that the rule in Colorado now accords with that in the majority
of states.
The Colorado wrongful death statute 6 specifically permits
recovery for the wrongful death of a minor child. It seems logical
to interpret the statute as permitting recovery for the total net
pecuniary loss rather than limitihg recovery to an arbitrary period
not set by the legislature.
The best argument in favor of limiting recovery to the years
of minority is that, while it is difficult for the jury to measure
the loss during minority, to permit recovery for the loss beyond
the years of minority would open the way for sheer speculation
by the jury. In answer to this, it should be pointed out that in
all cases the jury is instructed to permit recovery only for proven
damages. Where the plaintiff is able to prove a loss beyond the
minor years of deceased, e.g., where the twenty year old was mak'20 Colo. 178, 37 P. 721 (1894).
65 Colo. 40, 173 P. 200 (1918).
Colo. 17, 233 P. (2d) 382 (1951).
5125 Colo. 25, 240 P. (2d) 917 (1952).
"35 C.S.A., Ch. 50, Secs. 1, 2 and 3.
4124
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ing a substantial contribution to his parents at the time of his
death, it would be unjust and against the obvious intent of the
legislature to limit recovery to the period of minority.
The better rule, with which Colorado now is in accord, permits the jury, within the legal limit set by the court and legislature, to determine how much loss the plaintiff has proved, without
setting up some arbitrary limitation of years between the death
of the minor and the estimated life expectancy of the parent.
GEORGE GIBSON

STATUTES: ONLY A PARTY AFFECTED CAN CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY-The case of Higgins v. Sinnock I would appear to have been an attempt to accomplish indirectly that which could not have been done directly. This suit was
instituted as a class action on behalf of the old age pensioners,
and it sought a declaratory judgment on the validity of a recent
statute 2 that made elderly inmates of public institutions eligible
for old age pensions. Such inmates had previously been excluded,
so the result of the statute was to increase the number of persons
participating in the state's pension fund. This would appear to
give the plaintiffs a sufficient interest for them to challenge the
legislature's granting of these pensions, but this question did not
come before the court.
Conceding that the extension to these new eligibles was not
unconstitutional, the plaintiffs instead challenged a provision of
the act that the pension of an inmate would be paid to the chief
financial officer of the institution as a trustee. The theory of the
plaintiffs' case was that this procedural provision was not separable
and the whole act would have to fail if the court should rule that
this payment procedure was in violation of the state constitution.
This presented to the court the question as to whether the provisions were separable, and the court held that they were, pointing
out that the procedure for payment is entirely separate and distinct from the vesting of the rights.
This, then, left the question of whether the plaintiffs were in
a position to challenge the payment provision as such. The court
pointed out that the plaintiffs were not inmates of an institution
and that the method of payments did not affect their interests in
any respect. Accordingly, the court ruled that they were not proper
parties to bring this challenge. As a result, the court was not
called to rule upon the only part of the act that was attacked.
While the trial court declared the act constitutional, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, it is submitted that there
was no necessity for a determination of constitutionality. The rulings on the separability and on the requisite interest both appear
to be orthodox, and they produce the same result that a direct
11953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, p. 186.
2 CoLo. LAWS, C. 171 (1953).
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attack on the legislative grant of the pensions would have as conceded by the plaintiffs. This case was not decided on any principle
that one cannot do indirectly that which he cannot do directly, but
it is submitted that this is a good example of a case where that
result occurs.

T. H. CHRYSLER

To Whom It May Concern:
The Domestic Relations Division of the Second Judicial District has temporarily set up the following schedule which will be
in effect until further order:
MONDAYS:
Hearings on non-contested divorce actions. The
cases will be staggered through the day at twenty-minute intervals
to suit the convenience of the parties and of counsel. Counsel for
non-appearing defendants will be assigned either upon application of counsel or upon the Court's own motion when it appears
necessary or desirable. In all cases where counsel is not assigned
to represent the non-appearing defendant, the Court will request
plaintiff's attorney to inform defendant by registered mail (return
receipt requested) of the time and place the case will be heard,
informing him generally of his right to be present, etc.,-and following the hearing, plaintiff's counsel will send the defendant a
copy of the interlocutory decree.
TUESDAYS AND FRIDAYS: Hearings on motions for temporary
alimony, support, attorney's fees, and court costs, and the hearings will also be staggered through the day to suit the convenience
of parties and of counsel. In all such cases the Court is requesting
counsel to file at least five days before the hearing a sworn statement of all the assets of his client, and at the same time, furnish
a copy thereof to opposing counsel. In general, the affidavits should
contain a statement of all assets of both parties, earning capacity,
and employment, if any, the woman's minimum needs and requirements to support herself and children, and the husband's estimate
of his ability to pay. Also heard on Tuesdays and Fridays will be
citations and restraining orders.
WEDNESDAYS AND THURSDAYS: Hearings of contested matters
both as to divorce and property settlement.
The Court is asking the cooperation of counsel in this temporary arrangement, and also, full cooperation in attempting reconciliation of the parties whenever possible, and especially where
children are involved.
The Court, at a later date, expects to make known to lawyers
and the people of the community generally the facilities available
for marriage and family counseling, looking toward a broad preventive program, and with the hope of reducing the divorce rate
in the community.
JOSEPH E. COOK, Judge.
January 12, 1954.

DICTA

May, 1954

ADDITIONAL REAL ESTATE STANDARDS
The following real estate title standards were promulgated and
adopted by the Denver Bar Association on April 23, 1954. They
will be presented for adoption by the Colorado Bar Association at
the annual convention this fall.
STANDARD NO. 85
RELEASES:

Problem: A release of an encumbrance recites that the indebtedness secured thereby has been paid and that the encumbrance
is fully released. The release contains sufficient correct data
to identify reasonably the encumbrance intended to be released,
and purports to release all right, title and interest in the property described in the encumbrance. Is the encumbrance fully
released if:
1)

The legal description of the property in the release
omits some portion of the property described in the
encumbrance?

Answer: Yes.
2) The legal description in the release is so defective that
it would be inadequate in a conveyance?
Answer: Yes.
3) If a space in the release intended for a legal description is left blank?
Answer: Yes.
STANDARD NO. 86
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
SUPPLEMENTING STANDARD

No. 32.

Problem: Where a foreign corporation has qualified to do business
in Colorado subsequent to April 1, 1953, what document or
documents should be on file in the Recorder's Office to support
acquisition or conveyance of real estate?
Answer: There should be on file in the Recorder's Office in the
county where the real estate is situated, a Certificate of Authority from the Secretary of State as provided in Section 79,
Chapter 41, C.S.A. 1935.

